The threat came from abroad but was also very local: In mid-November, the organization Reporters Without Borders (RSF) identified more than 80 fake French-language news sites, many of which mimicked local media and echoed pro-Russian narratives. The NGO expressed concern about the potential consequences this network – reportedly linked to the Russian group Storm-1516 – could have on the municipal election campaign scheduled for March 15 and 22.
In theory, the more local an election is, the easier it is to influence. While shaping the outcome of a national election would require swaying millions of people, just a few hundred or thousand votes could tip the scales in a major city’s mayoral race. Since the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russia and pro-Russian actors have invested heavily in attempts to destabilize local elections in smaller countries.
In September 2025, Moldova’s legislative elections were targeted by a massive pro-Russian operation involving fake websites, fake social media accounts and the presence of agitators in the country. Ultimately, pro-European candidates opposed to Moscow won in this country of 2.9 million inhabitants – just slightly more than the 2.1 million residents of Paris. In 2024, disinformation campaigns linked to Azerbaijan also specifically targeted New Caledonia, though with limited effectiveness.
Greater interest in MPs
Of course, political choices made by major metropolitan areas are of interest to major foreign powers, sometimes for primarily economic reasons. But these elections are also particularly difficult for foreign actors to grasp. Few recent interference operations have demonstrated an in-depth understanding of French national politics; the nuances of the social, economic and political contexts in cities like Nice, Brest or Colmar are even more challenging for foreign actors to comprehend and exploit.
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